Russia vs Georgia: The Fallout,
The latest report from the International Crisis Group, examines the mistakes on all sides that led to war and offers comprehensive recommendations for the belligerent parties and international institutions. Both Georgia’s rash miscalculation in attacking its breakaway region of South Ossetia, and Russia’s disproportionate response in invading large portions of Georgia, make the conflicts over the separatist territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia far harder to resolve.
The urgent need is to implement fully the 15-16 August ceasefire, and most significantly, to ensure that Russian troops return immediately to pre-7 August positions. “Western states must press Moscow to accept the common understanding of the loosely-worded ceasefire, and not try to use loopholes to retain a de facto occupation of parts of Georgia.
International monitors should be deployed to observe Russian withdrawal and then help keep the ceasefire in South Ossetia and Abkhazia until the UN authorises an international peacekeeping mission, which Russia should be allowed to join but not dominate. Humanitarian aid must be freely distributed and displaced persons assisted in returning to their homes.
More broadly, Russia’s actions have undermined regional security; threatened vital energy corridors; made claims on ethnic Russians and other minorities that could be used to destabilise other former Soviet republics, including Ukraine; and shown disregard for international law.
The crisis raises questions about the compatibility of Russia’s intentions with the rights of other states on its borders. It has also raised concerns about the capacity of NATO, the UN and EU to address basic security challenges stemming from the aggressive self-confidence of a Moscow that feels the West has, since the Soviet Union collapsed, taken advantage of its weakness, ignored its interests, and maintained NATO in an unnecessarily confrontational way.
“Current rhetoric in Moscow and Western capitals is eerily reminiscent of the Cold War and will do nothing to resolve the crisis on the ground in Georgia or repair the damage done to European security”, “The West needs to address Russia’s behaviour not by isolating Moscow, but by engaging it in a way that is both hard-headed and conditional.”
The West should deliver a firm message to Russia that if it does not respect the ceasefire deal and cooperate in implementing the international peacekeeping mission, it will be met with a serious response, including suspension of its Moscow’s World Trade Organisation application and its participation in the G-8, and a challenge to its holding the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics.
But if Russia does now significantly moderate its behaviour, the message should be that the West is prepared to explore common security interests and ways to bridge differences, on a wide range of regional and global security and economic issues.
Russian actions reflected deeper factors, including pushback against the decade-long eastward expansion of the NATO alliance, anger over issues ranging from the independence of Kosovo to the placement of missile defence systems in Europe, an assertion of a concept of limited sovereignty for former Soviet states and a newfound confidence and aggressiveness in foreign affairs that is intimately linked with the personality and world view of Russia’s predominant leader, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.
Georgia, too, has mishandled its relationships with Russia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia since 2004, abandoning real confidence building and often following confrontational policies towards the conflict regions. With patience it might have demonstrated that the regions would be better served by enjoying extensive autonomy within an increasingly prosperous and democratising Georgia. Instead, President Mikheil Saakashvili and a small inner circle of bellicose officials used menacing and arrogant rhetoric that made the dispute with Moscow and the conflict regions bitter and personal. All sides bear responsibility for the humanitarian consequences of the violence, as tens of thousands of civilians in South Ossetia, Abkhazia and the rest of Georgia have been displaced amid disturbing reports of atrocities.
Western nations must eschew the worst of the Cold War mentality that would further isolate Russia, but engagement, as UK Foreign Secretary David Miliband has put it, has to be “hard-headed”. Russia cannot be allowed to maintain a military force in Georgia except as part of an international peacekeeping mission with non-Russian command, with a clear and mutually acceptable mandate in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The ceasefire signed on 15-16 August must be respected, and Russian troops must return promptly to the positions they held on 7 August, honouring the spirit of a loosely worded agreement. International monitors should be deployed in Georgia proper to observe Russian withdrawal and return of displaced persons (IDPs) and then serve as an interim measure to help maintain the ceasefire in South Ossetia and Abkhazia until a peacekeeping mission can be created.
Russian participation is probably necessary as a practical matter in the peacekeeping mission, although serious questions should be raised about the motives of the Russian forces that Moscow describes as peacekeepers. Command and composition should be genuinely international. All Georgian and Ossetian civilians displaced since 7 August need to be immediately allowed to return to their homes. The Russians and Georgians should agree to and cooperate with investigations to establish responsibility for human rights abuses during the conflict, including by the International Criminal Court (ICC) and perhaps the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).
None of this will be easy or even possible without a combination of significant pressures and pragmatic incentives to gain essential Russian approval. Moscow must be made to understand the advantages for its prestige, power and economy of being a partner in ensuring security in Europe rather than an outlier, subject to threats of exclusion from such institutions as the G8 and World Trade Organization (WTO).
The crisis also reflects serious mistakes by the U.S. and the European Union (EU) in Georgia since 2004, most significantly failing to adequately press President Saakashvili to abandon a quick-fix approach toward restoring Georgian control over South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The Georgian army was trained and sold weapons without ensuring that these would not be used to recover the conflict territories, and Russia’s anger over these actions and other perceived post-Cold War slights was misread. Instead of concentrating on democratic institutions and rule of law, the U.S. too often focused its support on Saakashvili personally, even as he engaged in reckless and authoritarian behaviour. As the long-frozen conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia began to heat up, Georgia’s partners did too little to encourage it to engage more substantially in confidence building and dialogue with the de facto authorities and Russia.
With regard to NATO, the division evident at its Bucharest Summit in April 2008 on whether to approve a membership action plan (MAP) for Georgia has been exacerbated. Those countries, led by the U.S., who support Georgia’s accession are pointing to the Russian attacks as clear proof that Georgia needs the protection of NATO security guarantees; those that oppose it believe that NATO dodged a bullet by not committing itself to go to war against Russia in defence of a capricious and reckless government in Tbilisi. A decision on MAP or membership status should not be taken in the heat of the current crisis. It will be difficult to finally resolve the membership issue, in relation to both Georgia and other potential members, without addressing the larger question of NATO’s future role as a security organisation.
At the broader level, the crisis raises significant questions about the capacity of the EU, the UN and NATO to address fundamental issues. While European leaders stepped forward to achieve the ceasefire agreement, their inability to put forward a forceful response to the Russian action reflects a lowest common denominator approach that discourages stronger and more innovative policies. Similarly, the UN Security Council, divided by whether to include references to Georgia’s territorial integrity in either a resolution or statement, has issued nothing on the conflict since it began to boil over on 7 August. In an unhappy reminder of the Cold War years, the conflict has called into question the Council’s capacity to address any issue over which P-5 members have significantly different interests. And in the process of seeking justification for its actions, Russia has also misstated and distorted the UN-approved principle of “responsibility to protect”.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
To the Member States of the UN Security Council:
1. Negotiate rapidly a resolution that:
a) acknowledges and welcomes the ceasefire signed 15-16 August 2008 and addresses the territorial integrity issues by confirming that it does not affect the legal situation that existed in the concerned area on 7 August 2008;
b) welcomes the dispatch of observers to serve as interim monitors of the ceasefire;
c) authorises for an initial period of one year the formation and operation of a peacekeeping mission, which may be, as appears most practical and expeditious, either a traditional UN mission or the mission of another appropriate international institution such as the OSCE, and is commanded on the military side by a senior soldier from outside the region and on the political side by a senior diplomat from outside the region. Russian participation in such a mission should be fully integrated into the international command structure and not form a separate force within the main force. This force should be mandated to:
i. ensure respect for the ceasefire signed on 15-16 August 2008;
ii. offer such assistance as may be deemed useful by the de facto South Ossetian and Abkhazian authorities to develop their institutions; and
iii. encourage contacts between the Georgian government, Georgian institutions and individuals and the de facto authorities of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, their institutions and individuals; and
d) establishes a forum in which the concerned parties, facilitated by the UN, as well as interested neighbouring states and international organisations such as the OSCE and EU, can urgently explore practical measures to improve the humanitarian and economic situation, as well as the possibility of more far-reaching political measures to achieve, ultimately, a resolution of the underlying problems that have produced conflict between Georgians, South Ossetians and Abkhazians, including regarding status.
2. Request that the Secretary-General, after consultations with all parties to the conflict and with relevant international organisations such as the OSCE, appoint an independent panel to conduct an investigation documenting August events in South Ossetia and Abkhazia as well as other parts of Georgia in which Russian forces established temporary presence. The purpose of the investigation should be to provide an accurate and complete accounting of what occurred in order to promote reconciliation and make it possible to ensure future accountability for any atrocity crimes.
To the Russian and Georgian Governments and the De Facto South Ossetian and Abkhazian Authorities:
1. Implement immediately and fully the six-point ceasefire agreement signed on 15-16 August 2008.
2. Assist monitoring of compliance by a strengthened OSCE Georgia Mission, with full freedom of movement throughout the country, until a more permanent and substantial international peacekeeping mission can be authorised and deployed.
3. Allow and support the immediate return of all newly displaced persons and refugees to their homes, provide unrestricted access for humanitarian aid, facilitate the exchange of prisoners and detainees, halt belligerent rhetoric and the issuing of false press reports, assist with the determination of the fate of the missing and cooperate with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and humanitarian airlifts, as well as with the International Criminal Court (ICC) and other investigating authorities.
Disclaimer: The views expressed are for academic purposes
Source www.crisisgroup.org
The urgent need is to implement fully the 15-16 August ceasefire, and most significantly, to ensure that Russian troops return immediately to pre-7 August positions. “Western states must press Moscow to accept the common understanding of the loosely-worded ceasefire, and not try to use loopholes to retain a de facto occupation of parts of Georgia.
International monitors should be deployed to observe Russian withdrawal and then help keep the ceasefire in South Ossetia and Abkhazia until the UN authorises an international peacekeeping mission, which Russia should be allowed to join but not dominate. Humanitarian aid must be freely distributed and displaced persons assisted in returning to their homes.
More broadly, Russia’s actions have undermined regional security; threatened vital energy corridors; made claims on ethnic Russians and other minorities that could be used to destabilise other former Soviet republics, including Ukraine; and shown disregard for international law.
The crisis raises questions about the compatibility of Russia’s intentions with the rights of other states on its borders. It has also raised concerns about the capacity of NATO, the UN and EU to address basic security challenges stemming from the aggressive self-confidence of a Moscow that feels the West has, since the Soviet Union collapsed, taken advantage of its weakness, ignored its interests, and maintained NATO in an unnecessarily confrontational way.
“Current rhetoric in Moscow and Western capitals is eerily reminiscent of the Cold War and will do nothing to resolve the crisis on the ground in Georgia or repair the damage done to European security”, “The West needs to address Russia’s behaviour not by isolating Moscow, but by engaging it in a way that is both hard-headed and conditional.”
The West should deliver a firm message to Russia that if it does not respect the ceasefire deal and cooperate in implementing the international peacekeeping mission, it will be met with a serious response, including suspension of its Moscow’s World Trade Organisation application and its participation in the G-8, and a challenge to its holding the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics.
But if Russia does now significantly moderate its behaviour, the message should be that the West is prepared to explore common security interests and ways to bridge differences, on a wide range of regional and global security and economic issues.
Russian actions reflected deeper factors, including pushback against the decade-long eastward expansion of the NATO alliance, anger over issues ranging from the independence of Kosovo to the placement of missile defence systems in Europe, an assertion of a concept of limited sovereignty for former Soviet states and a newfound confidence and aggressiveness in foreign affairs that is intimately linked with the personality and world view of Russia’s predominant leader, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.
Georgia, too, has mishandled its relationships with Russia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia since 2004, abandoning real confidence building and often following confrontational policies towards the conflict regions. With patience it might have demonstrated that the regions would be better served by enjoying extensive autonomy within an increasingly prosperous and democratising Georgia. Instead, President Mikheil Saakashvili and a small inner circle of bellicose officials used menacing and arrogant rhetoric that made the dispute with Moscow and the conflict regions bitter and personal. All sides bear responsibility for the humanitarian consequences of the violence, as tens of thousands of civilians in South Ossetia, Abkhazia and the rest of Georgia have been displaced amid disturbing reports of atrocities.
Western nations must eschew the worst of the Cold War mentality that would further isolate Russia, but engagement, as UK Foreign Secretary David Miliband has put it, has to be “hard-headed”. Russia cannot be allowed to maintain a military force in Georgia except as part of an international peacekeeping mission with non-Russian command, with a clear and mutually acceptable mandate in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The ceasefire signed on 15-16 August must be respected, and Russian troops must return promptly to the positions they held on 7 August, honouring the spirit of a loosely worded agreement. International monitors should be deployed in Georgia proper to observe Russian withdrawal and return of displaced persons (IDPs) and then serve as an interim measure to help maintain the ceasefire in South Ossetia and Abkhazia until a peacekeeping mission can be created.
Russian participation is probably necessary as a practical matter in the peacekeeping mission, although serious questions should be raised about the motives of the Russian forces that Moscow describes as peacekeepers. Command and composition should be genuinely international. All Georgian and Ossetian civilians displaced since 7 August need to be immediately allowed to return to their homes. The Russians and Georgians should agree to and cooperate with investigations to establish responsibility for human rights abuses during the conflict, including by the International Criminal Court (ICC) and perhaps the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).
None of this will be easy or even possible without a combination of significant pressures and pragmatic incentives to gain essential Russian approval. Moscow must be made to understand the advantages for its prestige, power and economy of being a partner in ensuring security in Europe rather than an outlier, subject to threats of exclusion from such institutions as the G8 and World Trade Organization (WTO).
The crisis also reflects serious mistakes by the U.S. and the European Union (EU) in Georgia since 2004, most significantly failing to adequately press President Saakashvili to abandon a quick-fix approach toward restoring Georgian control over South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The Georgian army was trained and sold weapons without ensuring that these would not be used to recover the conflict territories, and Russia’s anger over these actions and other perceived post-Cold War slights was misread. Instead of concentrating on democratic institutions and rule of law, the U.S. too often focused its support on Saakashvili personally, even as he engaged in reckless and authoritarian behaviour. As the long-frozen conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia began to heat up, Georgia’s partners did too little to encourage it to engage more substantially in confidence building and dialogue with the de facto authorities and Russia.
With regard to NATO, the division evident at its Bucharest Summit in April 2008 on whether to approve a membership action plan (MAP) for Georgia has been exacerbated. Those countries, led by the U.S., who support Georgia’s accession are pointing to the Russian attacks as clear proof that Georgia needs the protection of NATO security guarantees; those that oppose it believe that NATO dodged a bullet by not committing itself to go to war against Russia in defence of a capricious and reckless government in Tbilisi. A decision on MAP or membership status should not be taken in the heat of the current crisis. It will be difficult to finally resolve the membership issue, in relation to both Georgia and other potential members, without addressing the larger question of NATO’s future role as a security organisation.
At the broader level, the crisis raises significant questions about the capacity of the EU, the UN and NATO to address fundamental issues. While European leaders stepped forward to achieve the ceasefire agreement, their inability to put forward a forceful response to the Russian action reflects a lowest common denominator approach that discourages stronger and more innovative policies. Similarly, the UN Security Council, divided by whether to include references to Georgia’s territorial integrity in either a resolution or statement, has issued nothing on the conflict since it began to boil over on 7 August. In an unhappy reminder of the Cold War years, the conflict has called into question the Council’s capacity to address any issue over which P-5 members have significantly different interests. And in the process of seeking justification for its actions, Russia has also misstated and distorted the UN-approved principle of “responsibility to protect”.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
To the Member States of the UN Security Council:
1. Negotiate rapidly a resolution that:
a) acknowledges and welcomes the ceasefire signed 15-16 August 2008 and addresses the territorial integrity issues by confirming that it does not affect the legal situation that existed in the concerned area on 7 August 2008;
b) welcomes the dispatch of observers to serve as interim monitors of the ceasefire;
c) authorises for an initial period of one year the formation and operation of a peacekeeping mission, which may be, as appears most practical and expeditious, either a traditional UN mission or the mission of another appropriate international institution such as the OSCE, and is commanded on the military side by a senior soldier from outside the region and on the political side by a senior diplomat from outside the region. Russian participation in such a mission should be fully integrated into the international command structure and not form a separate force within the main force. This force should be mandated to:
i. ensure respect for the ceasefire signed on 15-16 August 2008;
ii. offer such assistance as may be deemed useful by the de facto South Ossetian and Abkhazian authorities to develop their institutions; and
iii. encourage contacts between the Georgian government, Georgian institutions and individuals and the de facto authorities of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, their institutions and individuals; and
d) establishes a forum in which the concerned parties, facilitated by the UN, as well as interested neighbouring states and international organisations such as the OSCE and EU, can urgently explore practical measures to improve the humanitarian and economic situation, as well as the possibility of more far-reaching political measures to achieve, ultimately, a resolution of the underlying problems that have produced conflict between Georgians, South Ossetians and Abkhazians, including regarding status.
2. Request that the Secretary-General, after consultations with all parties to the conflict and with relevant international organisations such as the OSCE, appoint an independent panel to conduct an investigation documenting August events in South Ossetia and Abkhazia as well as other parts of Georgia in which Russian forces established temporary presence. The purpose of the investigation should be to provide an accurate and complete accounting of what occurred in order to promote reconciliation and make it possible to ensure future accountability for any atrocity crimes.
To the Russian and Georgian Governments and the De Facto South Ossetian and Abkhazian Authorities:
1. Implement immediately and fully the six-point ceasefire agreement signed on 15-16 August 2008.
2. Assist monitoring of compliance by a strengthened OSCE Georgia Mission, with full freedom of movement throughout the country, until a more permanent and substantial international peacekeeping mission can be authorised and deployed.
3. Allow and support the immediate return of all newly displaced persons and refugees to their homes, provide unrestricted access for humanitarian aid, facilitate the exchange of prisoners and detainees, halt belligerent rhetoric and the issuing of false press reports, assist with the determination of the fate of the missing and cooperate with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and humanitarian airlifts, as well as with the International Criminal Court (ICC) and other investigating authorities.
Disclaimer: The views expressed are for academic purposes
Source www.crisisgroup.org
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